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REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT

Pursuant to Sixth Cir. R. 28(b)(1)(B) and 34(a), Appellants request that this
matter be set for oral argument. Such argument is appropriate because this appeal
involves a matter of first impression for this circuit. In addition, the questions of
law necessary to the disposition of this case will have a significant impact on the
operation of virtually all websites based in the United States.
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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

According to the final operative pleading, the Second Amended Complaint,
Doc. #22, Plaintiff/Appellee Sarah Jones (“Ms. Jones”) is a citizen of Kentucky.
Defendant/Appellant Dirty World, LLC (“Dirty World”) is a Delaware Limited
Liability

Company

with

its

principal

place

of

business

in

Arizona.

Defendant/Appellant Nik Lamas-Richie (“Mr. Richie”) is a citizen of the State of
California, although Ms. Jones alleged he was a citizen of Arizona. The Second
Amended Complaint alleged damages in excess of $75,000. The district court had
diversity jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
Following a jury trial, on July 11, 2013 the district court entered a final
judgment in favor of Ms. Jones. Doc. #208. Appellants’ Notice of Appeal was
timely filed on July 15, 2013. Doc. #209.
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

1

ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1.

Are Appellants entitled to immunity under the Communications Decency
Act, 47 U.S.C. 230(c)(1)?

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This action involves a single defamation claim arising from two usergenerated posts appearing on a website owned and operated by Appellants called
www.TheDirty.com. In general, the posts stated that Ms. Jones was promiscuous,
that her fiancé was unfaithful, that he tested positive for two sexually-transmitted
diseases, and that he bragged about having sex with Ms. Jones in her workplace.
It is undisputed that these posts were created by a third party who submitted
them to Appellants’ website. It is undisputed that the contents of the posts were
not created or modified in any way by Appellants. It is also undisputed that
following the publication of one of the posts, Mr. Richie posted his own comment
about it, asking, “Why are all high school teachers freaks in the sack?”
Appellants moved for summary judgment arguing that because Ms. Jones’s
claim was based on the “publication” of material created solely by a third party, the
claim was barred by the Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (the
“CDA”). The district court denied the motion, finding Appellants were responsible
for the “development” of the allegedly tortious material. The court also held that
Mr. Richie “adopted” the third party’s speech as his own by virtue of his “freak in
the sack” comment.
Following entry of a final judgment in favor of Ms. Jones, Appellants appeal
the district court’s denial of immunity.

3

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The question presented here is whether Appellants are immune under the
CDA. At the close of discovery, Appellants moved for summary judgment on that
issue but on January 10, 2012 the court denied the motion for various reasons. See
Jones v. Dirty World Entertainment Recordings, LLC, 840 F.Supp.2d 1008
(E.D.Ky. 2012).
Appellants sought immediate interlocutory review of the district court’s
order. This Court dismissed that first appeal on May 9, 2012, finding that the order
denying summary judgment was non-final and not otherwise subject to
interlocutory review under the collateral order doctrine.
Due to the non-final nature of the district court’s summary judgment order,
Appellants re-raised the CDA in a renewed summary judgment motion (Doc. #177)
and two mid-trial Rule 50(a) motions, all of which the district court denied for the
reasons stated in its original summary judgment order. See Jones v. Dirty World
Entertainment Recordings, LLC, --- F.Supp.2d ----, 2013 WL 4068780 (E.D.Ky.
2013). After two jury trials, a verdict was entered in favor of Ms. Jones on her
defamation claim.

However, because the district court’s determination that

Appellants were not protected by the CDA occurred at the summary judgment
stage based on the record presented at that time, the facts and evidence submitted
in conjunction with that motion will be briefly summarized here.
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Dirty World, LLC operates a website located at www.TheDirty.com. See
Affidavit of Nik Lamas-Richie (“Richie Aff.”) ¶ 1, ECF Doc. #64–2 at Page ID
#478. The site originally began in 2007 as www.DirtyScottsdale.com, which at the
time was primarily about Scottsdale, Arizona. Mr. Richie is the site’s founder. Id.
DirtyScottsdale.com was initially created to provide a forum for Mr. Richie
to express humorous satirical commentary and criticism based on his perception of
moral and social decay in Scottsdale’s nightlife and club scene. Richie Aff. ¶¶ 2–
4; Page ID #478–79. Mr. Richie’s brutally honest sense of humor struck a nerve
with his viewers and the site became popular overnight. Within a short period of
time, DirtyScottsdale.com expanded nationwide, eventually growing to cover more
than 50 different U.S. cities and more than 20 cities in Canada receiving an average
of 18 million hits per month. Richie Aff. ¶¶ 6–7; Page ID #479–80. In the process,
the site adopted a more geographically neutral name—www.TheDirty.com—and
Mr. Richie (who initially kept his true identity a secret) gained significant fame if
not infamy.
As the site grew, its focus and format changed. Among other things, Mr.
Richie no longer creates every post. Richie Aff. ¶ 8; Page ID #480. Rather, users
of the site (who colloquially refer to themselves as “The Dirty Army”) are now
permitted to “submit dirt” which can include news, photos, video or text on any
topic, and users can comment on material submitted by others.
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The site’s content submission form (ECF Doc. #64–2 at Page ID #504–05) is
100% neutral; it does not ask users to post anything about any particular individual,
nor does the form suggest what the author should say. The only instructions given
are: “Tell us what’s happening. Remember to tell us Who, What, When, Where,
Why.” Richie Aff. ¶ 12; Page ID #481.
At the time of the first motion for summary judgment in September 2011,
www.TheDirty.com contained approximately 90,000 posts on a variety of topics.
As explained in a supplemental affidavit filed 18 months later, “As of March 7,
2013, www.TheDirty.com contains a total of 121,863 separate posts in more than
900 separate categories. In addition, the site also contains a total of 3,182,200
comments about posts.” Doc. #177–1 at 1, ¶ 3; Page ID #2696. Many posts
feature gossip and commentary about local individuals who are not public figures,
but not all posts are of this type. On the contrary, material appearing on the site
covers a broad array of general topics such as politics, sports, business, the
economy, crime and so forth. Richie Aff. ¶¶ 11(a)–(h); Page ID #480–81.
Users of the website can submit posts on any topic; it is not necessary that
content be negative or derogatory in any way. Doc. #177–1 at 2, ¶ 4; Page ID
#2697. According to Mr. Richie, “users can (and do) submit posts about anything
or anyone, positive or negative, and as long as I think the topic is reasonably
interesting and not obviously unlawful, I will approve the post for publication.” Id.
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As part of the content submission process, users are provided with a blank
box where they can enter a title for their post, along with basic information about
the material they are submitting. Specifically, users are asked to identify the
“City”, “College”, and “Category” for their submission. Richie Aff. ¶ 13; Page ID
#481. In terms of categories, the user is required to pick from a list of more than
40 different options provided by the site which include: “I HAVE NO IDEA”,
“Business”, “News”, “Spring Break” and so forth. Richie Aff. ¶ 14; Page ID #481.
As the site’s editor, Mr. Richie reviews/moderates all new submissions, and
he rejects any that contain nudity/obscenity, vulgarity, threats, or other material
that Mr. Richie deems inappropriate.

Richie Aff. ¶ 15; Page ID #481–82.

Furthermore, as a general rule, Mr. Richie will typically make a short, one-line
comment about posts with some sort of humorous or satirical observation, but Mr.
Richie does not materially change, create, or modify any part of the user-generated
submission, nor does he “fact check” user submissions for accuracy. Id.
Although Ms. Jones’s operative Complaint (the Second Amended
Complaint; Doc. #22) only refers to one specific posting dated December 7, 2009,
this case centered primarily on two posts. The first, a copy of which is attached to
Mr. Richie’s affidavit as Exhibit J (ECF Doc. 64–2, Page ID #507) appeared on the
site on October 27, 2009 bearing the title: “Graham Does It Again”.
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The post featured two photos of Ms. Jones (who at the time was a
cheerleader for the Cincinnati Bengals) appearing at a public event with a Bengals
player named Shayne Graham. The author included the following text with the
post:
Nik, this is Sara J, Cincinnati Bengal Cheerleader. She’s
been spotted around town lately with the infamous Shayne
Graham. She has also slept with every other Bengal
Football player. This girl is a teacher too!! You would
think with Graham’s paycheck he could attract something a
little easier on the eyes Nik!

Mr. Richie did not create any part of this post, nor did he create the title of the post.
Richie Aff. ¶¶ 16–19; Page ID #482–83. Mr. Richie made no changes whatsoever
to either the text of the post or the title; all of this material was authored solely by
the third party who submitted it to the site. Id. Prior to the submission of this post,
Mr. Richie did not know Ms. Jones, had never met or spoken to her and had no
idea who she was. Richie Aff. ¶ 20; Page ID #483.
In keeping with his normal practice, after the post was submitted Mr. Richie
added a brief sarcastic quip regarding the Bengals football player shown in the
photos stating, “Everyone in Cincinnati knows this kicker is a Sex Addict. It is so
secret … he can’t even keep relationships because his Red Rocket has freckles that
need to be touched constantly.- nik”. Richie Aff. ¶ 21; Page ID #483. Nothing in
Mr. Richie’s comment referred to or disparaged Ms. Jones in any way.
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The second post, a copy of which is attached to Mr. Richie’s affidavit as
Exhibit K (ECF Page ID #509), appeared on the site five weeks later on December
7, 2009. Richie Aff. ¶ 16. This post included a publicly-available photograph of
Ms. Jones taken from the cover of the 2007 Ben-Gals cheerleader calendar on
which she appeared. The post included the following text:
Nik, here we have Sarah J, captain cheerleader of the playoff
bound cinci Bengals.. Most ppl [sic] see Sarah has [sic] a
gorgeous cheerleader AND highschool [sic] teacher.. yes she’s
also a teacher.. but what most of you don’t know is.. Her ex
Nate..cheated on her with over 50 girls in 4 yrs.. in that time he
tested positive for Chlamydia Infection and Gonorrhea.. so I’m
sure Sarah has them both.. whats [sic] worse is he brags about
doing sarah in the gym.. football field.. her class room at the
high school she teaches at DIXIE Heights.
As with the first post, each and every word of this text was created solely by the
third party author who submitted the post. Mr. Richie did not create any part of
this text or its title, nor did he modify any part of it. Richie Aff. ¶¶ 16–19.
As before, after the second post was submitted, Mr. Richie made a brief
comment which read: “Why are all high school teachers freaks in the sack?- nik”.
Richie Aff. ¶ 22; Page ID #483. This comment was not a factual assertion about
Ms. Jones’s character or chastity, but rather was a rhetorical and hyperbolic
expression of Mr. Richie’s opinion about a common stereotype—i.e., that high
school teachers publicly portray themselves as conservative while privately they
may have a sexually wild or adventurous side. Richie Aff. ¶ 23; Page ID #483.
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On December 9, 2009, a third post about Ms. Jones appeared on the site
bearing the title “Bengals Cheerleader Boyfriend”. A copy of this post is attached
to Mr. Richie’s affidavit as Exhibit L, Page ID #511. The author of this post
attached several photos of Ms. Jones and included the following text:
Nik, ok you all seen the past posting of the dirty Bengals
cheerleader/teacher… well here is her main man Nate. Posted a
few pics of the infected couple. Oh an [sic] for everyone saying
sarah is so gorgeous check her out in these non photoshopped pics.

As was true of the first post, each and every word of the above text was created
solely by the third party author who submitted the post; Appellants did not create
any part of this text, nor did they change any part of it. Richie Aff. ¶¶ 16–19.
Once again, Mr. Richie added a short comment about the post: “Cool tribal tat
man. For a second yesterday I was jealous of those high school kids for having a
cheerleader teacher, but not anymore.- nik”. Richie Aff. ¶ 24, Page ID #483.
After these three posts were published, Ms. Jones commenced this action on
December 23, 2009. See Doc. #1. Rather than suing Dirty World, LLC or Mr.
Richie, Ms. Jones initially named and served a California entity named “Dirty
World Entertainment Recordings LLC” which apparently operated a website with a
similar name—www.TheDirt.com.

This California entity has no relationship

whatsoever to www.TheDirty.com, Dirty World, LLC, or Mr. Richie. Richie Aff.
¶ 26; Page ID #484.
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Due to Ms. Jones’s high visibility as an NFL cheerleader, less than a week
after the lawsuit was filed several national media sources began covering this case.
Richie Aff. ¶ 27; Page ID #484. Following this media attention, additional posts
were submitted to www.TheDirty.com which mentioned Ms. Jones, the Bengals
and this case. Richie Aff. ¶¶ 28; Page ID #484. However, Ms. Jones did not allege
that any of these later posts were defamatory. Rather, the only actionable material
was found in the first post dated October 27, 2009 (suggesting Ms. Jones slept with
the entire Bengals team) and the second one dated December 7, 2009 (suggesting
that Ms. Jones’s fiancé cheated on her, tested positive for two STDs, and bragged
about having sex with Ms. Jones in her classroom).
Although he believed he was under no legal obligation to do so, after
learning about the lawsuit, Mr. Richie removed the first three posts regarding Ms.
Jones. Richie Aff. ¶ 30; Page ID #485.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
As noted above the question presented here is easily stated: was Ms. Jones’s
defamation claim barred by the CDA? The length of this brief notwithstanding,
the answer to that question turns on the meaning of a single word—development.
Under the CDA website operators and users are not liable for any speech
originating from another “information content provider” or “ICP”. The term ICP
is defined by 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3) as follows:
The term “information content provider” means any person or entity
that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development
of information provided through the Internet or any other interactive
computer service. (emphasis added)
Based on this definition, only those who “create” or “develop” defamatory
online speech are liable for it. All others who repeat or republish the same content
are immune.
In this case, Ms. Jones never seriously argued that Appellants created any
libelous speech about her. Even if she had made that argument, she presented no
evidence whatsoever to support it.
Instead, Ms. Jones claimed Appellants “developed” the actionable content so
the CDA did not apply. The district court fully and completely accepted that view.
The problem with the court’s holding is that it construed the term
“development” far too broadly to include activities like screening and selecting
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content that Congress unquestionably intended to protect via the CDA. Under the
district court’s excessively liberal interpretation of “development”, most website
operators would qualify as “developers” of speech posted by their users thus
rendering the CDA effectively worthless. For that reason, the district court’s
holding was legally erroneous and it cannot stand.
Instead, this Court should adopt and apply the clear and common-sense
definition of “development” used by virtually all other courts.

Specifically,

“development” means making a material contribution to the unlawful nature of
actionable content. To be clear—such “material contribution” does not include
reviewing, screening, or selecting content for publication, nor does it include
generally encouraging third parties to submit something to a website, nor does it
include making non-material (i.e., non-libelous) changes or edits to the content or
making non-actionable comments about material posted by users. Each of these
actions are precisely what Congress intended to protect, not to punish.
Under the correct definition of development, rather than forcing Appellants
to endure four years of litigation and two separate jury trials, the district court
should have held that Ms. Jones’s case was barred by the CDA. As such, the
judgment of the district court should be reversed and this action should be
remanded with instructions to enter final judgment in favor of Appellants.
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ARGUMENT
I.

APPELLANTS ARE ENTITLED TO CDA IMMUNITY
A.

Standard of Review—De Novo

In the proceedings below, Appellants raised the issue of CDA immunity
multiple times, most recently in the form of a mid-trial Rule 50 Motion for
Judgment as a Matter of Law. The district court denied that motion from the bench
and on August 12, 2013 it issued a written opinion explaining its reasoning. See
Jones v. Dirty World Entertainment Recordings, LLC, --- F.Supp.2d ---, 2013 WL
4068780 (E.D.Ky. August 12, 2013). A district court’s denial of a Rule 50 motion
is reviewed de novo. See Noble v. Brinker Intern., Inc., 391 F.3d 715, 720 (6th Cir.
2004) (“We review a district court’s denial of a motion for judgment as a matter of
law or a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law de novo.”) (citing United
States v. Alpine Indus., Inc., 352 F.3d 1017, 1022 (6th Cir. 2003)).
In addition, the CDA is not merely a shield against liability; it provides
immunity from suit. See Johnson v. Arden, 614 F.3d 785, 791 (8th Cir. 2010)
(explaining, “The majority of federal circuits have interpreted the CDA to establish
broad ‘federal immunity to any cause of action that would make service providers
liable for information originating with a third-party user of the service.’”) (quoting
Almeida v. Amazon.com, Inc., 456 F.3d 1316, 1321 (11th Cir. 2006)); see also
Jones, 840 F.Supp.2d at 1010 (agreeing, “Section 230 of the CDA immunizes
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providers of interactive computer services against liability arising from content
created by third parties … .”)
Because the district court denied Appellants’ CDA immunity claim, the
standard of review is also de novo; “Claims of entitlement to immunity are
questions of law, therefore they are reviewed de novo.”

Smith v. Leis, 407

Fed.Appx. 918, 927 (6th Cir. 2011) (citing Barnes v. Wright, 449 F.3d 709, 714 (6th
Cir. 2006)).
For each of these reasons, the standard of review is de novo.
B.

History And Background Of The CDA

This appeal presents an important matter of first impression for this Circuit
which has addressed the CDA only once in the past. See Doe v. Sexsearch.com,
551 F.3d 412 (6th Cir. 2008).1 However, Sexsearch was resolved on other grounds
and a full discussion of the CDA was expressly reserved “for another day”.
Sexsearch, 551 F.3d at 16. That day has now come.
Although it has not previously answered the question presented in this case,
this Court does not write on a blank slate. Rather, excluding only the Second, D.C.

1

This Court also briefly mentioned the CDA in a footnote in Seaton v.
TripAdvisor, LLC, --- F.3d ----, 2013 WL 4525870, *4 n.8 (6th Cir. 2013) (noting
that website operator “TripAdvisor cannot be held liable for its users’ statements
under the Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).”)
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and Federal circuits, all other federal appellate courts have addressed the CDA and
several (primarily the Ninth Circuit) have done so repeatedly.2
In addition, the CDA’s legislative history and background have been
exhaustively documented in hundreds of published lower-court decisions and
scholarly articles. See, e.g., David S. Ardia, Free Speech Savior or Shield for
Scoundrels: An Empirical Study of Intermediary Immunity Under Section 230 of
the Communications Decency Act, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 373 (2010) (analyzing 184
state and federal CDA cases); Hill v. StubHub, Inc., 727 S.E.2d 550, 558
(N.C.App. 2012) (noting, “According to our research, there have been
approximately 300 reported decisions addressing immunity claims advanced under
47 U.S.C. § 230 in the lower federal and state courts. All but a handful of these
decisions find that the website is entitled to immunity from liability.”)

2

See Universal Comm. Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413 (1st Cir. 2007); Green
v. America Online, Inc., 318 F.3d 465 (3rd Cir. 2003); Zeran v. America Online,
Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997); Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com,
Inc., 591 F.3d 250 (4th Cir. 2009); Doe v. MySpace, 528 F.3d 413 (5th Cir. 2008);
Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655 (7th Cir. 2003); Chicago Lawyers’ Committee For
Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666 (7th Cir. 2008);
Johnson v. Arden, 614 F.3d 785 (8th Cir. 2010); Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018 (9th
Cir. 2003); Carafano v. Metrosplash.Com. Inc., 339 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2003);
Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill, LLC, 488 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2007); Fair Housing
Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir.
2008) (en banc); Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 2009); Ben Ezra,
Weinstein & Co. v. America Online, Inc., 206 F.3d 980 (10th Cir. 2000); F.T.C. v.
Accusearch Inc., 570 F.3d 1187 (10th Cir. 2009); Almedia v. Amazon.com, Inc., 456
F.3d 1316 (11th Cir. 2006).
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Because the CDA’s origins, history and purpose have been so skillfully
documented elsewhere, for instance in seminal cases such as Zeran v. America
Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997), it might seem unnecessary to repeat that
well-documented history here. However, the rules and policy choices established
by the CDA are in many ways directly contrary to the long-standing common law
principles it abrogated.

For that reason, certain aspects of the CDA can be

somewhat counterintuitive and hard to accept, as this case plainly illustrates. To
help put the issues in context, it is thus important to begin with a brief discussion
of the events which caused Congress to adopt the CDA 17 years ago.
The CDA’s genesis was a pair of conflicting New York cases—Cubby, Inc.
v. CompuServe, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) and Stratton Oakmont,
Inc. v. Prodigy Servs., Co., 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995). The first case,
Cubby, involved an online message board known as “Rumorville USA”. See
Cubby, 775 F.Supp. at 137–38. The defendant, CompuServe, hosted the message
board but did not exercise any editorial control over its contents, nor did
CompuServe pre-screen any user-generated content before publication. See id.
Instead, all posts on Rumorville were unmonitored and uncensored.
A third party user posted material on the Rumorville board which allegedly
defamed the plaintiff, Cubby. See id. at 138. In turn, Cubby sued CompuServe for
defamation. Cubby’s theory was founded on one of libel law’s oldest tenets;
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“Ordinarily, ‘one who repeats or otherwise republishes defamatory matter is
subject to liability as if he had originally published it.’” Id. at 139. This is
precisely the same vintage legal theory Ms. Jones successfully asserted here.
CompuServe moved for summary judgment on the grounds that it did not
review or monitor any of the content on the Rumorville board, and thus should be
treated as a “distributor” rather than as a “publisher”. This distinction was crucial
because publishers are essentially strictly liable for any defamatory speech they
publish, while distributors are liable only for content that they “knew or should
have known” was defamatory. Id. at 141.
After reviewing the facts, the court held CompuServe was a distributor:
Technology is rapidly transforming the information industry. A
computerized database is the functional equivalent of a more
traditional news vendor, and the inconsistent application of a lower
standard of liability to an electronic news distributor such as
CompuServe than that which is applied to a public library, book store,
or newsstand would impose an undue burden on the free flow of
information. Given the relevant First Amendment considerations, the
appropriate standard of liability to be applied to CompuServe is
whether it knew or had reason to know of the allegedly defamatory
Rumorville statements.
Id. at 140–41.
Following that legal determination, the court held there was no evidence that
CompuServe knew any material on the Rumorville page was false. As such,
summary judgment was granted in its favor. See id. at 144.
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Four years later in 1995, the opposite result occurred in Stratton Oakmont v.
Prodigy. In that case, like in Cubby, the defendant (Prodigy) hosted an online
message board containing allegedly defamatory statements posted by third parties.
See Stratton Oakmont, 1995 WL 323710, *1. However, unlike CompuServe which
did nothing to review or screen any third party submissions, Prodigy took several
steps to reduce the amount of harmful content on its network.
Among other things, Prodigy established “content guidelines” in which
“users are requested to refrain from posting notes that are ‘insulting’ and are
advised that ‘notes that harass other members or are deemed to be in bad taste or
grossly repugnant to community standards, or are deemed harmful to maintaining a
harmonious online community, will be removed when brought to PRODIGY’s
attention”. 1995 WL 323710, *2. Prodigy also used software to automatically
block profanity and it enlisted “board leaders” to monitor posts and enforce content
guidelines. See id.
Based on these efforts to reduce the amount of offensive content on its
network, “PRODIGY held itself out as an online service that exercised editorial
control over the content of messages posted on its computer bulletin boards,
thereby expressly differentiating itself from its competition and expressly likening
itself to a newspaper.”

Id.

Given these facts, the court found that unlike
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CompuServe, Prodigy was more akin to a publisher than a distributor, meaning it
was strictly liable for all third party material posted on its site:
The key distinction between CompuServe and Prodigy is two fold.
First, Prodigy held itself out to the public and its members as
controlling the content of its computer bulletin boards. Second,
Prodigy implemented this control through its automatic software
screening program, and the Guidelines which Board Leaders are
required to enforce. By actively utilizing technology and manpower
to delete notes from its computer bulletin boards on the basis of
offensiveness and “bad taste”, for example, Prodigy is clearly making
decisions as to content, and such decisions constitute editorial control.
That such control is not complete and is enforced both as early as the
notes arrive and as late as a complaint is made, does not minimize or
eviscerate the simple fact that Prodigy has uniquely arrogated to itself
the role of determining what is proper for its members to post and read
on its bulletin boards. Based on the foregoing, this Court is compelled
to conclude that for the purposes of Plaintiffs’ claims in this action,
Prodigy is a publisher rather than a distributor.

Stratton Oakmont, 1995 WL 323710, *4 (emphasis added).
Because Prodigy tried to block and/or remove at least some offensive
content from its pages, the court concluded it was legally responsible for all
remaining content; “Prodigy’s conscious choice, to gain the benefits of editorial
control, has opened it up to a greater liability than CompuServe and other
computer networks that make no such choice.”

Id. at *5 (emphasis added).

However, the court presciently observed this result might be short-lived; “the
Court also notes that the issues addressed herein may ultimately be preempted by
federal law if the Communications Decency Act … is enacted.” Id.
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Viewed together, Cubby and Stratton Oakmont reflected a troubling pair of
pre-CDA standards—website owners who did not screen, prevent or remove
harmful third party content (like CompuServe) were rewarded with protection
from defamation and related tort claims. On the other hand, website owners who
tried to reduce and remove offensive content (like Prodigy) were punished for
doing so by facing limitless liability for any remaining material on their sites.
Eliminating this perverse result was one of the primary reasons Congress
enacted the CDA a year later. Indeed, lawmakers expressly said so; “‘One of the
specific purposes of [Section 230] is to overrule Stratton Oakmont v. Prodigy and
any other similar decisions … .’” Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1029 (quoting S.REP. NO.
104-230, at 194 (1996)) (brackets in original and also noting, “Without the
immunity provided in Section 230(c), users and providers of interactive computer
services who review material could be found liable for the statements of third
parties, yet providers and users that disavow any responsibility would be free from
liability.”); H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104–458, at 194 (1996)); see also Barrett v.
Rosenthal, 40 Cal.4th 33, 50–54, 146 P.3d 510, 520–23 (Cal. 2006) (setting forth
detailed legislative history and noting that reversing “backward” result from
Stratton Oakmont was an important goal of the CDA).
Against this backdrop, there is no question Congress intended the CDA to
encourage website owners to actively screen, review and moderate third party
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posts, and to remove offensive content when necessary, without fear of liability;
“In some sort of tacit quid pro quo arrangement with the service provider
community, Congress has conferred immunity from tort liability as an incentive to
Internet service providers to self-police the Internet for obscenity and other
offensive material, even where the self-policing is unsuccessful or not even
attempted.” Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F.Supp. 44, 52 (D.D.C. 1998); see also
Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330 (concurring; “In line with this purpose, § 230 forbids the
imposition of publisher liability on a service provider for the exercise of its
editorial and self-regulatory functions.”); Barrett, 40 Cal.4th at 53, 146 P.3d at 522
(noting, “Both the terms of section 230(c)(1) and the comments of Representative
Cox reflect the intent to promote active screening by service providers of online
content provided by others.”)
This protection is not all-or-nothing. It does not require a website owner to
choose between publishing all of a particular third party submission or none of it.
Rather, under the CDA website operators are free to edit, alter or modify
user-generated content without losing immunity; as long as their edits do not
materially change the content’s original meaning, immunity still applies; “the
exclusion of ‘publisher’ liability necessarily precludes liability for exercising the
usual prerogative of publishers to choose among proffered material and to edit the
material published while retaining its basic form and message.” Batzel, 333 F.3d
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at 1031; see also Roommates, 521 F.3d at 1163, 1169 (observing, “In passing
section 230, Congress sought to spare interactive computer services this grim
choice by allowing them to perform some editing on user-generated content
without thereby becoming liable for all defamatory or otherwise unlawful
messages that they didn’t edit or delete.”); DiMeo v. Max, 433 F.Supp.2d 523, 530
(E.D.Pa. 2006) (agreeing, “one of Congress’s goals in enacting § 230 was to
promote this kind of self-regulation. Thus, ‘development of information’ must
mean ‘something more substantial than merely editing portions of content and
selecting material for publication.”), aff’d, 248 Fed.Appx. 208 (3rd Cir. 2007);
Donato v. Moldow, 374 N.J.Super. 475, 865 A.2d 711 (N.J. 2005) (website
operator immune under CDA despite allegation that he “actively participated in
selective editing, deletion and re-writing of anonymously posted messages.”)
However, granting website owners the freedom to screen and edit usergenerated content was not the CDA’s only intended function. A different yet
equally important purpose was “to encourage the unfettered and unregulated
development of free speech on the Internet … .” Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1027. The
Fourth Circuit further explained this point in Zeran:
Section 230 was enacted, in part, to maintain the robust nature of
Internet communication, and accordingly, to keep government
interference in the medium to a minimum … .
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The specter of tort liability in an area of such prolific speech would
have an obvious chilling effect. It would be impossible for service
providers to screen each of their millions of postings for possible
problems. Faced with potential liability for each message republished
by their services, interactive computer service providers might choose
to severely restrict the number and type of messages posted. Congress
considered the weight of the speech interests implicated and chose to
immunize service providers to avoid any such restrictive effect.

Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330. To that end, “Section 230 therefore sought to prevent
lawsuits from shutting down websites and other services on the Internet.” Batzel,
333 F.3d at 1028; see also Roommates, 521 F.3d at 1175 (warning, “We must keep
firmly in mind that this is an immunity statute we are expounding, a provision
enacted to protect websites against the evil of liability for failure to remove
offensive content … . [S]ection 230 must be interpreted to protect websites not
merely from ultimate liability, but from having to fight costly and protracted legal
battles.”) (emphasis added).
To help ensure the CDA functions as Congress intended, “The majority of
federal circuits have interpreted the CDA to establish broad ‘federal immunity to
any cause of action that would make service providers liable for information
originating with a third-party user of the service.’” Johnson, 614 F.3d at 791
(quoting Almeida, 456 F.3d at 1321); Universal Comm. Sys., 478 F.3d at 418
(“[t]he other courts that have addressed these issues have generally interpreted
Section 230 immunity broadly … .”); Global Royalties, Ltd. v. Xcentric Ventures,
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LLC, 544 F.Supp.2d 929, 931 (D.Ariz. 2008) (noting, “In light of Congress’ goals
to encourage development of the internet and to prevent the threat of liability from
stifling free expression, CDA immunity has been interpreted very broadly.”)
As explained further infra, the CDA’s dual purposes—to promote unfettered
speech and to encourage website owners to actively screen content—bear special
significance in this case. This is so because unlike the hundreds of cases which
reached the opposite result, the court here found that CDA immunity never applies
to website owners who review, screen, and moderate third party submissions or
those who fail to immediately remove all dubious content upon demand; “In the
view of this Court, the Act’s text indicates that it was intended only to provide
protection for site owners who allow postings by third parties without screening
them and those who remove offensive content.” Jones, 2013 WL 4068780, *3
(emphasis added).
This holding was, for lack of a better term, indefensible. The district court
actually punished Appellants for doing exactly what the CDA was intended to
encourage and protect. This holding was wrong and it must be reversed.
C.

General Standards For Applying CDA

Prior to discussing how the law applies to the facts here, the analysis begins
with the 26 words in the relevant statute, 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1):
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No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated
as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another
information content provider.
Given this simple language, courts have generally adopted an equally simple threepart test to determine whether the CDA applies in a specific case::
1.)

Is the defendant a provider or user of an “interactive computer
service”?

2.)

Do the plaintiff’s claims require treating the defendant as a
“publisher or speaker” of information?
And finally:

3.)

Was the allegedly actionable material provided by another
information content provider?

See Universal Comm. Sys., 478 F.3d at 418 (setting forth three-part test); Beckman
v. Match.com, 2013 WL 2355512, *3 (D.Nev. 2013) (adopting similar test).
Applying these standards here, Appellants are clearly entitled to immunity.
1.

Appellants Are Both Providers And Users Of An Interactive
Computer Service

To begin, the first prong of the test is easily met because websites qualify as
an “interactive computer service” within the meaning of the CDA; “Courts
generally conclude that a website falls within ‘the definition of an interactive
computer service.’” Zuckerberg, 2012 WL 6725588, *3 (quoting Ascentive, LLC
v. Opinion Corp., 842 F.Supp.2d 450, 473 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (collecting cases from
the First, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits)); see also Accusearch, 570 F.3d at 1195.
26

The fact that Mr. Richie occasionally posts his own comments on
www.TheDirty.com does not affect this analysis in any way. It simply means that
in addition to acting as a website provider, Mr. Richie is also a website user. This
makes no difference because the CDA applies equally to both; “§ 230(c)(1) confers
immunity not just on ‘providers’ of such services, but also on ‘users’ of such
services.” Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1030.
Thus, as long as Mr. Richie did not create or develop the actionable content,
he remains immune even if he created or developed other content; “There is
nothing inconsistent or unusual about a website operator being both an interactive
computer service provider or user and an information content provider. The two
are not mutually exclusive.” Donato, 374 N.J.Super. at 490, 865 A.2d at 720;
Gentry v. eBay, 99 Cal.App.4th 816, 833 n.11, 121 Cal.Rptr.2d 703, 717 n.11
(Cal.App. 4th Dist. 2002) (opining, “It is not inconsistent for [a website operator] to
be an interactive service provider and also an information content provider; the
categories are not mutually exclusive. The critical issue is whether [the website
operator] acted as an information content provider with respect to the information
that … is false or misleading.”).
Because Mr. Richie and Dirty World provide and run an interactive website
where users can post and read messages, the answer to the first question is YES.
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2.

Appellants Were Treated As “Publishers” Or “Speakers”
Of Information

The second prong asks whether the claims at issue require treating the
defendant as a “publisher or speaker” of information. Here, there is no dispute this
prong was satisfied because the sole cause of action was defamation. See Doc.
#207 (jury instructions). Defamation claims are squarely within the scope of the
CDA because they require the defendant to “publish” something defamatory. See
Okeke v. Cars.com, 40 Misc.3d 582, 586, 966 N.Y.S.2d 843, 846 (N.Y.City Civ.
Ct. 2013) (explaining, “the CDA mandates that such providers cannot be deemed
to be a ‘publisher’ or ‘speaker’ of third-party content, thereby having the practical
effect of barring defamation claims, which are the most common type of tort claim
associated with the CDA.”); see also Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1101 (noting, “The cause
of action most frequently associated with the cases on section 230 is defamation.”)
Ms. Jones’s defamation claim treated Appellants as publishers/speakers of
information. As such, the answer to the second question is also YES.
3.

All Actionable Material Was Provided Solely By Another
Information Content Provider

The third and final prong asks whether the allegedly actionable material
provided by another information content provider; i.e., a third party.

If so, then

Appellants are immune from any claim based on their “publication” of that
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material. See MySpace, 528 F.3d at 419 (explaining, “[S]o long as a third party
willingly provides the essential published content, the interactive service provider
receives full immunity regardless of the specific editing or selection process.”)
Here, Mr. Richie’s testimony on this point was uncontroverted and
unequivocal—he played no role in the creation or development of the information
Ms. Jones alleged was false:
¶ 19. To be clear—I did not create any of the posts about Plaintiff,
nor did I create the titles to any of these posts. I did not edit, change,
alter, or modify these posts or their titles in any manner. I did not ask
or encourage anyone else to submit these posts on my behalf, nor did I
ask the site’s viewers to submit anything regarding Plaintiff. All of
this material originated solely with a third party or parties.

ECF Doc. 64–2; Page ID #483.
What evidence did Ms. Jones offer to refute this testimony? None. In fact,
as noted above, when the court found that the CDA did not apply at the summary
judgment stage, Ms. Jones offered no evidence on this point other than Mr.
Richie’s deposition transcript and an unauthenticated transcript of an interview Mr.
Richie gave to TV talk show host Dr. Phil McGraw during which Ms. Jones was
never mentioned.

See Doc. #66, 67.

However, nothing in those transcripts

contradicted any part of Mr. Richie’s affidavit.
The undisputed evidence therefore showed that the only actionable material
in this case—comments claiming that Ms. Jones “slept with every other Bengal
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football player” and implying that she had two STDs and had sex in her
classroom—was created and submitted by a third party user of the site acting
without any encouragement or instruction from Appellants and these comments
were published exactly as they were submitted. Given those undisputed facts, Ms.
Jones’s defamation claim was barred; “This is precisely the kind of situation for
which section 230 was designed to provide immunity.” Roommates, 521 F.3d at
1174.
Of course, the district court rejected this argument. As explained infra, the
court’s holding was factually and legally erroneous.
D.

The District Court’s CDA Analysis Was Erroneous

As noted above the district court found Appellants were not entitled to
immunity because the court held they “developed” the defamatory comments about
Ms. Jones, and as developers, they were not entitled to immunity. This holding
was wrong because the court construed the word “develop” so broadly that it
encompassed editorial conduct the CDA was unquestionably intended to protect.
As noted above, the importance of the word “develop” derives from the
phrase “information content provider” found in Section 230(c)(1). Although many
cases substitute the term “third party” or “other party” in its place, the phrase is a
term of art defined by 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3) as follows:

30

The term ‘information content provider’ means any person or entity
that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development
of information provided through the Internet or any other interactive
computer service. (emphasis added)
In this definition, the word “development” plays a critical role in deciding
when CDA immunity is lost—if a website provider or user is responsible for
creating or developing unlawful material, then the CDA does not apply. Put
differently, the CDA only prohibits plaintiffs from suing website owners for
content that came from another source; i.e., a third party or other “information
content provider”.

Therefore, if a website owner creates or “develops” the

unlawful content itself, then such material is not from another source.
Ms. Jones never seriously argued that Appellants “created” the text she
claims was defamatory, nor did she offer any evidence to support that conclusion.
Instead, citing just two cases—Accusearch and Roommates—she argued that
Appellants “developed” the actionable content in various ways. The district court
agreed with this argument both as a matter of law and a matter of fact, but its
holding was erroneous on both fronts.
1.

The District Court Applied The Wrong Legal Standard For
“Development”

Here, the court interpreted the word “development” to mean any act by a
website owner that somehow encourages users to post offensive content. On that
point, the court explained: “the controlling test for determining immunity [is] as
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follows: … a service provider is ‘responsible’ for the development of offensive
content only if it in some way specifically encourages the development of what is
offensive about the content.’” Jones, 840 F.Supp.2d at 1011 (emphasis in original)
(quoting Accusearch, 570 F.3d at 1199). As this circular statement shows, the
court felt that if a website owner does anything to encourage offensive content,
then it necessarily developed that content and is an “information content provider”
and thus is no longer immune. This holding grossly misinterprets the law as
discussed in Accusearch.
Accusearch involved an unusual set of facts none of which were present
here, so the case warrants some discussion. In Accusearch, the defendant operated
a website called www.Abika.com which sold various types of information and
records to the public. See Accusearch, 570 F.3d at 1191. Among other things, the
site sold access to private telephone records, including, “details of incoming or
outgoing calls from any phone number, prepaid calling card or Internet Phone[.]”
Id. Selling these records violated federal law and “Acquisition of this information
would almost inevitably require someone to violate the Telecommunications Act
or to circumvent it by fraud or theft.” Id. at 1192. The Federal Trade Commission
sued Accusearch to prohibit further sales of these “inherently unlawful” records.
Accusearch argued that even if selling private phone records was illegal, it
was entitled to immunity because the records were actually obtained by third party
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“researchers” not by Accusearch itself. Both the district court and the Tenth
Circuit rejected this argument, finding the website operator played a direct and
material role in the process such that it was responsible for “developing” the
unlawful content.
Key to this holding was the fact that Accusearch itself directly participated
in the unlawful conduct: “Accusearch solicited requests for confidential
information protected by law, paid researchers to find it, knew that the researchers
were likely to use improper methods, and charged customers who wished the
information to be disclosed.” Accusearch, 570 F.3d at 1201 (emphasis added).
Under those facts, the court determined the CDA did not apply because “a website
helps to develop unlawful content, and thus falls within the exception to section
230, if it contributes materially to the alleged illegality of the conduct.” Id. at 1200
(emphasis added) (quoting Roommates, 521 F.3d at 1168).
In sum, Accusearch did not involve a simple online message board where
comments and posts were submitted by third party users (as in this case). Instead,
customers seeking to purchase illegal phone records placed orders directly with
Accusearch itself and paid a fee directly to Accusearch.

These unlawful

transactions could not have been completed without the direct participation of
Accusearch itself.

Thus, Accusearch materially contributed to the unlawful

conduct and was not protected.
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None of these facts were present here. Appellants did not pay or solicit third
parties to create defamatory posts regarding Ms. Jones. Rather, as explained in Mr.
Richie’s affidavit, Appellants operate a free website which provides users with a
100% neutral content submission form.

Unlike Accusearch, the undisputed

evidence showed that nothing about www.TheDirty.com is “inherently unlawful”.
Although it certainly contains some risqué content, the site also contains vast
numbers of general news items concerning sports, politics and so forth. Further,
Appellants’ Terms of Service (Doc. #177–1 at ECF Page ID # 2788–89) expressly
instructed users not to post unlawful content; “Comments or any other material
which is false, defamatory, or otherwise unlawful is not allowed.”
Even if some users break the rules and submit unlawful content, it is not
because Appellants “encouraged” or “caused” them to do so; “One might as well
say that people who save money ‘cause’ bank robbery, because if there were no
banks there could be no bank robberies. An interactive computer service ‘causes’
postings only in the sense of providing a place where people can post.” Chicago
Lawyers Comm., 519 F.3d at 671. The mere presence of some unlawful content on
Appellants’ site does not mean Appellants “caused” or “induced” users to post it;
“Section 230(c)(1) would serve little if any purpose if [websites] were found liable
under state law for ‘causing’ or ‘inducing’ users to post unlawful content in this
fashion.” Dart v. Craigslist, Inc., 665 F.Supp.2d 961, 969 (N.D.Ill. 2009).
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In addition to citing Accusearch (which itself relied heavily on the Ninth
Circuit’s decision in Roommates) the district court also specifically suggested that
Roommates supported its view. However, even a cursory inspection of that case
shows the contrary is true.
Roommates involved allegations that the defendant (the operator of a
roommate-matching website) violated federal law, specifically the Fair Housing
Act, by requiring users to answer questions about their age, race, sex and marital
status as a condition of using the site. See 521 F.3d at 1161–62. The court found
that merely asking for this type of information in a housing-related transaction was
inherently unlawful and thus the CDA did not apply. 3
Thus, by creating unlawful questions and requiring all users to answer them,
the website operator itself was materially involved in developing the unlawful
content; “Roommate’s own acts–posting the questionnaire and requiring answers
to it–are entirely its doing and thus section 230 of the CDA does not apply to
them.” See Roommates, 521 F.3d at 1165. In reaching this holding, the Ninth
Circuit offered a clear and simple definition of the word ‘development’: “we
interpret the term ‘development’ as referring not merely to augmenting the content
3

Four years after denying CDA immunity based on the assumption that the
website’s own questions were unlawful, the Ninth Circuit found that the questions
were not unlawful. See Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v.
Roommates.com, LLC, 666 F.3d 1216 (9th Cir. 2012). This outcome shows the
denial of immunity was erroneous.
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generally, but to materially contributing to its alleged unlawfulness. In other
words, a website helps to develop unlawful content, and thus falls within the
exception to section 230, if it contributes materially to the alleged illegality of the
conduct.” Id. at 1167–68 (emphasis added). The Ninth Circuit even offered an
example of the type of material contribution that would vitiate immunity; “a
website operator who edits in a manner that contributes to the alleged illegality–
such as by removing the word ‘not’ from a user’s message reading ‘[Name] did not
steal the artwork’ in order to transform an innocent message into a libelous one–is
directly involved in the alleged illegality and thus not immune.” Id. at 1169
(emphasis in original).
This standard—making a material contribution to the unlawful nature of the
post by removing words to change an innocuous message into a libelous one—is
clearly not the rule applied by the district court in this case. Under the correct
standard from both Roommates and Accusearch, Appellants retained their
immunity because they did not create, alter, or change (materially or otherwise)
any of the content that Ms. Jones claimed was false. All such content was created
by third parties and was passively displayed in its unaltered form exactly as it was
submitted to the site. See Doc. #64–2 at 6, ¶ 19; Page ID #483.
Again, this result is strongly supported by Roommates. After finding the
website owner was not entitled to protection for requiring users to answer unlawful
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questions, the court addressed a separate argument—that the defendant impliedly
encouraged users to post unlawful content by providing a section where users
could post “Additional Comments” about themselves. The Ninth Circuit rejected
this argument, finding that the CDA’s broad protection could not be withheld on
such a “weak” basis:
[The plaintiff] Councils argue that–given the context of the
discriminatory questions presented earlier in the registration process–
the “Additional Comments” prompt impliedly suggests that
subscribers should make statements expressing a desire to discriminate
on the basis of protected classifications; in other words, Councils
allege that, by encouraging some discriminatory preferences,
Roommate encourages other discriminatory preferences when it gives
subscribers a chance to describe themselves. But the encouragement
that bleeds over from one part of the registration process to another is
extremely weak, if it exists at all. Such weak encouragement cannot
strip a website of its section 230 immunity, lest that immunity be
rendered meaningless as a practical matter.

Roommates, 521 F.3d at 1174 (emphasis added).
To eliminate any doubt, the court emphasized this point repeatedly:
It’s true that, under a pedantic interpretation of the term “develop,”
any action by the website–including the mere act of making a text box
available to write in–could be seen as “develop[ing]” content.
However, we have already rejected such a broad reading of the term
‘develop’ because it would defeat the purpose of section 230.

Id. at 1174 n.38.
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Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit found that even if users posted unlawful
content in the “Additional Comments” section of their profiles, the website owner
was not responsible for developing that material:

Roommate publishes these comments as written. It does not provide
any specific guidance as to what the essay should contain, nor does it
urge subscribers to input discriminatory preferences. Roommate is not
responsible, in whole or in part, for the development of this content,
which comes entirely from subscribers and is passively displayed by
Roommate. Without reviewing every essay, Roommate would have
no way to distinguish unlawful discriminatory preferences from
perfectly legitimate statements. Nor can there be any doubt that this
information was tendered to Roommate for publication online. This is
precisely the kind of situation for which section 230 was designed to
provide immunity.
521 F.3d 1173–74 (emphasis added).
As these passages make clear, neither Roommates nor Accusearch support
the rule applied by the district court in this case; i.e., that generally encouraging
offensive4 content makes the website owner a “developer” of all such content.

4

Although it is not necessary to reach this issue, the district court’s suggestion that
“offensive” speech is somehow entitled to less protection than non-offensive
speech raises serious constitutional concerns; “If there is a bedrock principle
underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the
expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or
disagreeable.” Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414, 109 S.Ct. 2533, 105 L.Ed.2d
342 (1989). On the contrary, “[T]he fact that society may find speech offensive is
not a sufficient reason for suppressing it. Indeed, if it is the speaker’s opinion that
gives offense, that consequence is a reason for according it constitutional
protection.” FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 745, 98 S.Ct. 3026, 3038, 57
L.Ed.2d 1073 (1978).
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Other courts share this view. For instance, in Best Western Int’l, Inc. v.
Furber, 2008 WL 4182827 (D.Ariz. 2008), the plaintiff (a hotel chain franchisor)
sued a website operator for creating a page that contained allegedly defamed the
plaintiff’s business.

The plaintiff argued the CDA did not apply because

defendant’s site “encouraged” users to post defamatory statements. The court
rejected this argument:
[Plaintiff] BWI also contends that [defendant] Furber is not entitled to
CDA immunity because he created the website homepage to solicit
content from others and therefore is a content provider. But the
homepage does not explicitly solicit tortious material. BWI claims
that the homepage impliedly suggests that visitors should make
statements defaming BWI. The Court does not agree. But even if this
were true, it is insufficient to strip Furber of CDA immunity.

Id. *10 (emphasis added) (citing Roommates, 521 F.3d at 1173–74).
In a similar case, a website called www.RipoffReport.com was held immune
even assuming the name of the site encouraged users to post defamatory
statements; “It is obvious that a website entitled Ripoff Report encourages the
publication of defamatory content.

However, there is no authority for the

proposition that this makes the website operator responsible, in whole or in part,
for the ‘creation or development’ of every post on the site.” Global Royalties, 544
F.Supp.2d at 933. See also Giordano v. Romeo, 76 So.3d 1100 (Fla.3d Dist. 2011)
(same).
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These points are efficiently summarized by the New York Court of Appeals’
recent decision in Shiamili v. The Real Estate Group of New York, Inc., 952 N.E.2d
1011, 17 N.Y.3d 281 (N.Y. 2011), a case with facts almost identical to those here.
In Shiamili, like in this case, the plaintiff sued a website operator claiming that it
was responsible for defamatory posts appearing on the defendant’s website, even
though it was undisputed that the posts were written by a third party. See Shiamili,
17 N.Y.3d at 258–86, 952 N.E.2d at 1014–15. Like in this case, the plaintiff
argued that the website administrator lost immunity for three reasons: 1.) the
administrator added an anti-Semitic statement referring to the plaintiff as “King of
the Token Jews”; 2.) the administrator “promoted” the original content by moving
it from a blog comment mixed in with other comments to a stand-alone article, and
3.) the website was intended to “encourage” the posting of negative information.
Like Ms. Jones, the plaintiff in Shiamili cited both Roommates and
Accusearch for the idea that these actions “encouraged” defamatory material. In a
clear and concise manner, the court rejected each point, finding that none of the
website host’s actions “materially contributed” to the illegality of the third party’s
statements and therefore the host retained its CDA immunity:
As an initial matter, the complaint alleges that the defamatory
statements were first posted by anonymous users; there is no
allegation that defendants actually authored the statements. A website
is generally not a “content provider” with respect to comments posted
by third-party users. We reject Shiamili’s contention that defendants
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should be deemed content providers because they created and ran a
website which implicitly encouraged users to post negative comments
about the New York City real estate industry. Creating an open forum
for third-parties to post content—including negative commentary—
is at the core of what section 230 protects.
Shiamili, 17 N.Y.3d at 290–91, 952 N.E.2d at 1018 (emphasis added).
The Court explained its view of Accusearch and Roommates as follows:
Those cases, however, are easily distinguishable. In Roommates.com,
the non-parties providing the data were required to post actionable
material to the defendant website as a condition of use, and the
website’s “work in developing the discriminatory questions,
discriminatory answers and discriminatory search mechanism [was]
directly related to the alleged illegality of the site”. Here, in contrast,
there are no allegations that posting false and defamatory content was
a condition of use, or that the site worked with users to develop the
posted commentary. This case also differs considerably from
Accusearch Inc., where the defendant website paid researchers to
obtain information for the site to disseminate that “would almost
inevitably require [the researcher] to violate the Telecommunications
Act or to circumvent it by fraud or theft”. There is no comparable
allegation against these defendants.
Id. (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
This same is true here—there is no evidence in this case showing that
Appellants require users to post unlawful material (as in Roommates), nor was
there any evidence showing that Appellants paid the author of the postings
about Ms. Jones to create false or unlawful material about her (as in
Accusearch). In the absence of such evidence, the district court’s reliance on
Roommates and Accusearch was improper.
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The final point discussed in Shiamili is one of the most important of all—the
court concluded that even though the website operator “added” his own comments
to the third party’s post by inserting an offensive anti-Semitic statement calling the
plaintiff “King of the Token Jews”, the court agreed that this type of nondefamatory statement was per se insufficient to affect the website’s immunity
under the CDA; “This is not a defamatory statement, since no ‘reasonable reader
could have concluded that ... [it was] conveying facts about the plaintiff’. The
illustration was obviously satirical and, although offensive, it cannot by itself
support Shiamili’s claim of defamation. Nor, contrary to the dissent’s view, does it
‘develop’ or ‘contribute to the illegality’ of the third-party content within the
meaning of the CDA.” Shiamili, 17 N.Y.3d at 292–93, 952 N.E.2d at 1020.
In the proceedings below, Appellants cited Shiamili and argued that its logic
applied here. Despite this, the district court did not mention or discuss Shiamili,
except by referencing the dissent judge’s opinion from that case in a footnote. See
Jones, 840 F.Supp.2d at 1013 n.5. If the district court followed Shiamili, it would
have concluded Ms. Jones’s claims were barred by the CDA.
As Shiamili, Accusearch and Roommates each demonstrate, mere general
encouragement of content, offensive or banal, is not sufficient to strip a website
owner of immunity. Such an amorphous standard sets the bar far too low and
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“would defeat the purposes of section 230 by swallowing up every bit of the
immunity that the section otherwise provides.” Roommates, 521 F.3d at 1167.
Instead, the correct standard as explained in Roommates is very simple—
immunity does not apply when the website operator materially contributes to the
creation of unlawful content, such as by removing words to change a message from
innocuous into libelous or by creating its own independently unlawful speech.
Under that standard, the district court’s denial of immunity in this case was clearly
erroneous. This point is easily demonstrated by a simple fact—the statements Ms.
Jones claimed were defamatory would be equally actionable without Mr. Richie’s
comments, and Mr. Richie’s satirical comments, standing alone, could not have
supported any claim. Accordingly, Mr. Richie’s comments were immaterial and
thus Appellants were, and are, immune under the CDA.
2.

No Evidence Showed That Appellants “invited, encouraged,
and adopted defamatory posts” About Ms. Jones

As explained above, the district court’s narrow construction of the CDA and
the term “development” was legally erroneous. For that reason alone, the denial of
immunity was improper and the judgment in favor of Ms. Jones must be reversed.
However, even assuming arguendo that the district court’s legal analysis
was correct, the court still fundamentally erred. This is so because there was no
evidence to show that Appellants actually encouraged anyone to submit any

43

offensive or defamatory material about Ms. Jones. See Collins v. Purdue Univ.,
703 F.Supp.2d 862, 879 (N.D.Ind. 2010) (finding that even if website operator
“invit[ed] readers’ comments” about an online article, the CDA still applied
because “none of the facts before the court show any encouragement by for readers
to comment on the website articles in a defamatory way.”) (emphasis added).
Specifically, after adopting the incorrect legal test for development
discussed above, the court identified three specific points to show that Appellants
“encouraged” the posts about Ms. Jones:
1.)

The name of Appellants’ website; www.TheDirty.com;
“First, the name of the site in and of itself encourages the
posting only of ‘dirt,’ that is material which is potentially
defamatory or an invasion of the subject’s privacy.” Jones,
840 F.Supp.2d at 1012.

2.)

The manner in which Mr. Richie operates the site; “He
reviews the postings but does not verify their accuracy. If
someone objects to a posting, he decides if it should be
removed. It is undisputed that Richie refused to remove the
postings about plaintiff that are alleged to be defamatory or
an invasion of privacy.” Id.

3.)

Mr. Richie’s Own Comments; “Most significantly, Richie
adds his own comments to many postings, including several
of those concerning the plaintiff. In these comments, he
refers to ‘the fans of the site’ as ‘the Dirty Army.’ He also
adds his own opinions as to what he thinks of postings.” Id.

Taking each separately, it is clear that none of these points supported the
court’s decision to deny immunity.
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A.

The Name Of Appellants’ Site Is Irrelevant

Without citing any legal authority, the district court held that the name of
Appellants’ website—www.TheDirty.com—meant they were responsible for
developing every post on the site because “the name of the site in and of itself
encourages the posting only of ‘dirt,’ that is material which is potentially
defamatory or an invasion of the subject’s privacy.” Jones, 840 F.Supp.2d at 1012.
The court went even further, stating, “The principal content of ‘the dirty.com’ web
site is not only offensive but tortious.” Id. at 1011. This holding was wrong as a
matter of law and wrong as a matter of fact.
First, as a matter of law, every other court that has considered the same
argument has reached the opposite conclusion. For instance, after the Kentucky
court denied summary judgment in this case, a different federal court in Missouri
granted summary judgment in Appellants’ favor in S.C. v. Dirty World, LLC, 2012
WL 3335284 (W.D.Mo. 2012). In that case under virtually identical facts, the
court explained the name of Appellants’ website was irrelevant; “the CDA focuses
on the specific content at issue and not the name of a website.” Id. at *5 (emphasis
added) (citing Global Royalties, supra, 544 F.Supp.2d at 933); Ascentive, LLC v.
Opinion Corp., 842 F.Supp.2d 450, 473 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (holding website named
www.pissedconsumer.com was entitled to CDA immunity despite offensive
name); Shiamili, supra, 952 N.E.2d 1011, 17 N.Y.3d 281, 2011 WL 2313818
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(N.Y. 2011) (finding operator of website called www.shittyhabitats.com entitled to
CDA immunity despite offensive name of site).
These holdings make perfect sense because as the Court of Appeals
recognized in Shiamili, the CDA was not intended to protect websites that host
only non-controversial material. On the contrary, “Creating an open forum for
third parties to post content—including negative commentary—is at the core of
what section 230 protects.” Shiamili, 952 N.E.2d at 1018, 17 N.Y.3d at 290–91.
This leads to an important yet subtle point overlooked by both Ms. Jones and
the district court: websites that do not contain any offensive content—e.g.,
http://butterflies-and-rainbows.blogspot.com—do not need the CDA to survive.
This is so because people rarely file lawsuits over excessively positive or laudable
speech. Rather, they only sue when the speech is negative, offensive or hurtful.
Thus, as a practical matter the CDA can only be implicated when the speech
at issue is negative rather than positive. For that reason, the district court’s logic
was completely backwards—rather than giving protection to those websites which
need it most, the court would offer CDA protection only to those sites which need
it least (or not at all).
This Court should reject this inverted view and follow the sensible logic of
cases such as Shiamili by holding, as a matter of law, that the name of Appellants’
website is irrelevant to the question of whether they “developed” the content at
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issue.5 Such a rule is appropriate because if a website’s name was somehow
relevant to its CDA immunity, this would lead to freakish and almost certainly
unconstitutional results wherein the owner of a website with a benign name such as
www.TheClean.com or an arbitrary name such www.Abika.com would be entitled
to immunity for publishing the exact same content that appears on
www.TheDirty.com. Nothing in the language or legislative history of the CDA
would support such an arbitrary and capricious result.
Furthermore, granting or withholding immunity based on a single judge’s
subjective opinion about the tastefulness of a website’s name ignores a simple
truth—for better or for worse, offensive Internet speech is common. See DiMeo,
433 F.Supp.2d at 533 (recognizing, “Some of the dialogue on the Internet surely
tests the limits of conventional discourse. Speech on the Internet can be unfiltered,
unpolished, and unconventional, even emotionally charged, sexually explicit, and
vulgar–in a word, ‘indecent’ in many communities. But we should expect such
speech to occur in a medium in which citizens from all walks of life have a
voice.”) For better or worse, it is a fact of modern life that offensive online speech
is extremely pervasive, even on mainstream websites with non-offensive names.
See, e.g.,, Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1120 (describing “cruel and sadistic” material

5

For obvious reasons, the court need not consider the question of how to treat a
website entitled: www.PleasePostDefamatoryContentAboutSarahJones.com.
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posted

anonymously

on

website

with

non-offensive

name,

www.matchmaker.com); Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1098 (noting, “This case stems from
a dangerous, cruel, and highly indecent use of the internet for the apparent purpose
of revenge” although name of website—www.yahoo.com—was not offensive);
M.A. v. Village Voice Holdings, LLC, 809 F.Supp.2d 1041, 1043 (E.D.Mo. 2011)
(describing “horrific victimization” of plaintiff, a minor, who was victim of online
sex trafficking although the name of website—www.backpage.com—was not
offensive); Doe v. America Online, Inc., 783 So.2d 1010 (Fla. 2001) (finding CDA
barred claims against website operator arising from child pornography marketed
and sold via website with non-offensive name; www.aol.com).
As these cases show, regardless of a website’s name, offensive online
content is common. Thus, denying immunity based simply on a website’s mildly
derogatory name would do little or nothing to reduce harmful speech while
creating an arbitrary exception to the CDA larger than the rule itself.
However, even if the CDA permitted courts to deny immunity if they found
the website’s name was inherently unlawful, that rule would still not apply here.
This is so because as this court recently noted in Seaton v. TripAdvisor, there is
nothing unlawful about referring to someone or something as “dirty”, even when
using the superlative term “dirtiest”. Either word is a non-factual expression of
opinion; “the meaning of ‘dirtiest’ is not easily pinned down when read beside
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these quotations; therefore, readers would not interpret ‘dirtiest’ as making an
assertion of fact.” Seaton, 2013 WL 4528570, *5; see also Adelson v. Harris, --F.Supp.2d ----, 2013 WL 5420973, *19 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (finding words “dirty”
and “tainted”, although derogatory, “are ‘concepts whose content is so debatable,
loose and varying, that they are insusceptible to proof of truth or falsity.’”)
Again, this point is easily demonstrated by looking at the facts of this case.
Contrary to the district court’s holding, the undisputed summary judgment
evidence here showed that www.TheDirty.com is not devoted solely or even
primarily to tortious content, just as www.Amazon.com is not devoted exclusively
to South American rainforests, www.Apple.com has little to do with pomaceous
fruit, and www.TheDailyBeast.com is not about wild animals.
Rather, as explained in Mr. Richie’s two uncontroverted affidavits,
www.TheDirty.com contains a wide variety of non-defamatory and noncontroversial news stories about sports, politics, celebrities, and so forth. Ms.
Jones offered no evidence to refute this testimony. It is therefore not surprising
that the district court cited no evidence to support its conclusion that “[t]he
principal content of ‘the dirty.com’ web site is not only offensive but tortious.”
Jones, 840 F.Supp.2d at 1011. That aspect of the court’s holding had no
evidentiary basis, as the Missouri court rightly observed in S.C.; “Factually, the
Plaintiff has not presented any evidence that the Website is devoted to ‘dirt’ about

49

private citizens or is merely ‘a portal for defamatory material.’ To the contrary, the
Defendant has shown that the Website contains posts on a number of topics,
including sports, politics, and other world events.” S.C., 2012 WL 3335284. The
same is true here. For these reasons, the district court plainly erred when it held
that CDA immunity was lost due to the name of Appellants’ website.
B.

Appellants Operate www.TheDirty.com In A Manner
The CDA Was Intended To Encourage And Protect

The second reason immunity was denied focused on “the manner in which
[www.TheDirty.com] is managed.” On this point, the court explained: “Richie
acts as editor of the site and selects a small percentage of submissions to be posted.
He adds a ‘tagline.’ He reviews the postings but does not verify their accuracy. If
someone objects to a posting, he decides if it should be removed.” Jones, 840
F.Supp.2d at 1012.6 Based on these facts, the court found Mr. Richie should be
treated as a “developer” of all content appearing on the site.
6

The court also stated: “It is undisputed that Richie refused to remove the postings
about plaintiff that are alleged to be defamatory or an invasion of privacy.” Jones,
840 F.Supp.2d at 1012. This conclusion was factually untrue. See Doc. #64–2 at
8, ¶ 30. However, this point is irrelevant because the CDA protects website
operators even when they refuse to remove material upon request. See Mmubango
v. Google, Inc., 2013 WL 664231, *3 (E.D.Pa. 2013) (“Google cannot be held
liable for failing to withdraw this statement once it has been published.”); Black v.
Google, Inc., 2010 WL 3222147, *3 (N.D.Cal. 2010) (same); (Shrader v.
Biddinger, 2012 WL 97632, *8 (D.Colo. 2012) (same); Global Royalties, 54
F.Supp.2d at 931–32 (same).
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There is little need to belabor this point—the court essentially disregarded
the CDA and applied the same pre-1996 standards used in Stratton Oakmont. In
this way, the court not only ignored the law, it punished Mr. Richie for doing
exactly what Congress intended to encourage—screening and moderating thirdparty submissions so that at least some offensive content is curtailed.
Once again, it was undisputed that in his role as the website’s moderator,
Mr. Richie invoked the CDA’s broad protection to actively review and remove at
least some offensive content such as “nudity/obscenity, threats of violence,
profanity, racial slurs, etc.” Doc. #64–2 at 4, ¶ 15.

In addition, Mr. Richie

explained that since mid-2009, he has removed more than 2,200 posts from the site
after receiving requests from users. Doc. 177–1 at 4, ¶¶ 10–12, Page ID #2699.
Since the CDA was adopted in 1996, no court anywhere has agreed that
immunity could be lost based on such conduct. On the contrary, unanimous
authority (including the same authority cited by the district court) holds these are
precisely the types of editorial actions Congress intended to encourage with the
CDA; “any activity that can be boiled down to deciding whether to exclude
material that third parties seek to post online is perforce immune under section
230.” Roommates, 521 F.3d at 1171; see also Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330 (agreeing,
“lawsuits seeking to hold a service provider liable for its exercise of a publisher’s
traditional editorial functions--such as deciding whether to publish, withdraw,
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postpone or alter content--are barred.”); Ben Ezra, Weinstein, and Company, Inc. v.
America Online Inc., 206 F.3d 980, 986 (10th Cir. 2000) (concurring, “Congress
clearly enacted § 230 to forbid the imposition of publisher liability on a service
provider for the exercise of its editorial and self-regulatory functions.”)
Mr. Richie’s decisions concerning the selection and removal of content are
classic editorial choices which are per se protected by the CDA. See DiMeo, 433
F.Supp.2d at 530 (rejecting argument that defendant “developed” content by
selecting which posts to publish and by editing their contents; “If ‘development of
information’ carried the liberal definition that [plaintiff] suggests, then § 230
would deter the very behavior that Congress sought to encourage.”); see also Levitt
v. Yelp!, Inc., 2011 WL 5079526 (N.D.Cal. 2011).
As such, the court’s decision to deny immunity on the basis of Mr. Richie’s
editorial conduct and management of the site was wrong and must be reversed.
C.

Mr. Richie’s Own Comments Are Irrelevant

The final point referenced by the district court was this—by adding a
rhetorical remark—asking “why are all high school teachers freaks in the sack?”—
Mr. Richie “effectively ratified and adopted the defamatory third-party post.”
2013 WL 4068780, *4. Yet again, this holding was wrong both as a matter of fact
and law.
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Factually, the court’s conclusion is simply not an accurate characterization
of the evidence. Mr. Richie’s obviously sarcastic quip did not “adopt” or “ratify”
the facts in the post. Mr. Richie did not express any personal knowledge that the
facts submitted by the post’s author were true, nor did he say “I agree with these
statements and adopt them as my own.”
Instead, Mr. Richie did essentially the same thing as the website operator in
Shiamili; he expressed his own personal viewpoint which was arguably mildly
derogatory but he did not change the meaning of the original post in any way. In
addition to Shiamili, other courts have agreed the CDA fully protects such conduct.
See Phan v. Pham, 182 Cal.App.4th 323, 328, 105 Cal.Rptr.3d 791, 795 (Cal.App.
3rd Dist. 2010) (holding CDA protected defendant who added introductory
sentence to allegedly defamatory email before forwarding it to others; “using the
material contribution test from Roommates, it is evident that defendant … made no
material contribution to the alleged defamation in the e-mail … . That is, the only
possible defamatory content is to be found in the e-mail was the original content
received by defendant … from [the author]. Nothing ‘created’ by defendant …
was itself defamatory.”); see also Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1022.
The same is true here. Mr. Richie’s “freak in the sack” comment was
plainly not actionable on its own. The only actionable content was the original
content submitted to the site by the author. Under the material contribution test
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from Roommates, Mr. Richie’s after-the-fact quip did not materially contribute to
the unlawfulness of the original post. Thus, suggesting that Mr. Richie “ratified”
the original post is simply an impermissible effort to treat him as the “publisher or
speaker” of words created by another person, exactly what the CDA prohibits.
Legally, despite hundreds of cases interpreting the CDA, no court anywhere
has recognized the existence of an exception based on a website owner “ratifying”
or “adopting” content submitted by a third party user. On the contrary, all courts to
considered this argument have rejected it.
For instance, in Parisi v. Sinclair, 774 F.Supp.2d 310 (D.D.C. 2011) the
plaintiff sued various defendants for defamation arising from the online marketing
and sale of a book. Although it was undisputed that one of the defendants (a
bookstore called “Books-A-Million” or “BAM”) did not create the actionable
material, the plaintiff argued that BAM lost CDA immunity because it “adopted”
the false statements as its own. The district court rejected this argument:
Plaintiffs also attempt to claim that CDA immunity should be withheld
because BAM adopted the promotional statements as its own. However,
they cite no applicable law for this proposition. Indeed, it would be contrary
to the purpose of the CDA, which sought to encourage the “‘vibrant and
competitive free market’ of ideas on the Internet,” by establishing immunity
for internet publication of third-party content to require a fact-based analysis
of if and when a defendant “adopted” particular statements and revoke
immunity on that basis.
Parisi, 774 F.Supp.2d at 316 (emphasis added) (citing Nemet Chevrolet, 591 F.3d
at 253 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(2)).
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Similarly, in Milo v. Martin, 311 S.W.3d 210 (Tx.App. 2010), the plaintiff
argued that the defendant (a website operator) lost its immunity by “endorsing and
vouching” for the truthfulness and veracity of material posted on its site by
anonymous third parties. This theory was based on the defendant’s description of
his site: “The Watchdog is a monthly publication by newsletter and website. It
contains facts believed to be totally accurate by sources with character and
truthfulness as their primary attributes. Our agenda is the truth and nothing less.”
Milo, 311 S.W.3d at 216. Based on this comment, the plaintiff argued that “by
vouching for the truthfulness of the third party statements, [defendant] contributed
to the development of the material and is therefore not immune from liability.” Id.
The Texas court wisely rejected this argument, finding that a reasonable
person viewing posts on the site would not interpret the website owner’s comment
as meaning that he “had investigated the information contained within the posts on
that portion of the site, and there is nothing to indicate that [defendant] had
vouched for the truth of any of the statements within the ‘Guest Book’ itself.” Id.
For that reason, the court found the defendant remained immune under the CDA
because it did not “materially contribute” to the alleged unlawfulness of the
content within the meaning of Roommates. Id. at 217. As these cases show, the
CDA simply does not contain an exception permitting the denial of immunity
based on “adopting” or “ratifying” content submitted by others.
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D.

Additional Comments

As noted above, in its original order denying CDA immunity, the district
court suggested that Mr. Richie generally “encouraged” users to submit offensive
content, and thus he was responsible for the “development” of every post on the
site. As explained above, Appellants dispute the legal conclusion that immunity
can be lost on this basis.
However, the court also suggested that Mr. Richie went further and actually
encouraged users to submit posts about Ms. Jones in particular. Specifically, when
it initially denied immunity, the court pointed to several comments created by Mr.
Richie including one which read: “I love how the Dirty Army has war mentality.”
In the court’s view, “One could hardly be more encouraging of the posting of such
content than by saying to one’s fans (known not coincidentally as “the Dirty
Army”): ‘I love how the Dirty Army has war mentality.’” Jones, 840 F.Supp.2d at
1012–13.

In this way, the court believed that Mr. Richie’s comments

“encouraged” users to submit more posts defaming Ms. Jones.
The court’s conclusion was, in fact, self-disproving for one simple reason—
at the time the first post about Ms. Jones (suggesting that she “slept with the entire
Bengals team”) was submitted on October 27, 2009, there was not a single
comment regarding Ms. Jones anywhere on the site from Mr. Richie or anyone
else.

Additionally, Mr. Richie’s “war mentality” and similar comments were
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published after the two allegedly defamatory posts were submitted and, most
importantly, Ms. Jones offered no evidence showing that any more defamatory
statements were submitted after Mr. Richie’s comments were made.
Unfortunately, the district court apparently misunderstood or ignored the
evidence on this point. Specifically, in its final CDA ruling, the court attempted to
support its position as follows:
Richie made other comments which encouraged further defamatory
posts concerning plaintiff, such as: “I love how the DIRTY ARMY has
war mentality;” “Never try to battle the DIRTY ARMY;” and “You
dug your own grave here Sarah.” Following these comments, an
additional defamatory post was made on the site on January 9, 2010,
accusing plaintiff of “sle[eping] with every other Bengals Football
player.” (Doc. 64–2 at 30).
Jones, 2013 WL 4068780, *5 (emphasis added).
The court’s conclusion was simply mistaken as a matter of fact. The post
cited above was not submitted in January 2010; it was submitted on October 27,
2009—more than a month before Mr. Richie’s “war mentality” and other remarks.
The evidence on this point was both clear and undisputed.

The post

referenced by the court which accused Ms. Jones of sleeping with every Bengals
player was actually the very first post submitted to the site on October 27, 2009.
Although the exhibit (ECF Doc. #64–2, Page ID #507) referenced by the district
court does appear to be dated January 9, 2010, that date represented the last time
the post was “updated”, not the original date it was first posted on the site.
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This issue was explained in footnote 1 of Mr. Richie’s summary judgment
affidavit filed months before the district court initially denied immunity:
The first post about Plaintiff appeared on the site on October
27, 2009 bearing the title “Graham Does It Again”. This post
was subsequently updated on January 9, 2010 when I added an
additional editorial comment to the bottom of the page as
reflected by several asterisks. Other than this update, the
October 27, 2009 and January 9, 2010 posts were identical.
Because any pages on the site are automatically overwritten
once an update or revised version is published, the original
version of the October 27, 2009 post (i.e., the one without the
January 9, 2010 update) is not available.
Doc. #64–2 at 5, Page ID #482.
Again, Ms. Jones offered no evidence to controvert Mr. Richie’s testimony
on this point. Thus, the undisputed evidence showed the post accusing Ms. Jones
of sleeping with the entire Bengals team was submitted on October 27, 2009, and
Mr. Richie’s “war mentality” comment was made regarding a different post (in
which Ms. Jones did not even appear) dated December 19, 2009—nearly two
months later. See ECF Doc. #64–2 at Page ID #519.
Given these facts, there was absolutely no basis for the district court to
conclude that Mr. Richie’s later comments somehow “encouraged further
defamatory posts concerning plaintiff” because no further defamatory comments
were ever submitted. Thus, even if the district court was correct in holding that
immunity could be denied based on a showing that Mr. Richie somehow
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encouraged users to submit material about Ms. Jones, there is no evidence that any
such encouragement actually occurred here.
II.

CONCLUSION
For all the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court should be

reversed and this matter remanded with instructions to enter judgment in favor of
Appellants.
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